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Abstract
The present article is a first attempt to add new theoretical arguments to the 
rationale of State immunity. The author tries to assert that upholding State 
immunity for human rights violations should not logically lead to the impunity 
of State officials acting on behalf of the State. On the contrary, the right to 
State immunity is an essential precondition for the individual perpetrators to be 
prosecuted and convicted. To come to this conclusion, the author first finds that 
universal jurisdiction is a tool to prosecute individuals and not States. On this 
basis, he argues that functional immunity ratione materiae and State immunity 
should be distinguished. This leads to the consequence that State officials’ and 
State’s responsibility are of different nature.
“There is cogency in the view that unless responsibility is imputed 
and attached to persons of flesh and blood, it rests with no one.”1
A. Introduction
In its judgment Jurisdictional Immunities of the State, the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ) decided upon different submissions put forward by the 
Federal Republic of Germany against the Italian Republic.2 In particular, the 
Court stated that: (1) customary international law still requires that “a State 
should be accorded immunity in proceedings for torts allegedly committed on 
the territory of another State by its armed forces and other organs of State in 
the course of conducting an armed conflict”;3 (2) customary international law 
provides that “a State cannot be deprived of immunity by reason of the fact 
that [its organs are] accused of serious violations of international human rights 
law or the international law of armed conflict”,4 i.e. no human rights exception 
to the rule of State immunity exists; (3) even violations of so-called jus cogens 
norms cannot lead to a denial of State immunity, since no jus cogens exception to 
the rule of State immunity exists under customary international law;5 (4) State 
immunity cannot be denied on the basis of a so-called ‘last resort argument’ 
1   H. Lauterpacht, International Law and Human Rights (1950), 40.
2   Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy: Greece Intervening), Judgment, ICJ 
Reports 2012, 99 [Jurisdictional Immunities of the State, Judgment].
3   Ibid., 135, para. 78.
4   Ibid., 139, para. 91.
5   Ibid., 142, para. 97.
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either, that is on the basis of the fact that all victims’ attempts to seek redress 
from Germany had previously failed, because whether a State is entitled to 
immunity is a question separate from “whether the international responsibility 
of that State is engaged and whether it has an obligation to make reparation”.6
Despite the fact that the decision of the ICJ provides a partially correct 
reconstruction of the general international law with regard to the immunity of 
foreign States from jurisdiction, it nevertheless leaves itself quite open to criticism 
according to which this view would merely defend the status quo and does not 
offer any hope of a practical solution to the pressing demand for justice made 
by the relatives of victims;7 it is, in other words, a defense based exclusively on 
the risk that a possible denial of State immunity would set off a new diplomatic 
crisis between the nations of the international community, or lead to the risk 
of bankruptcy for the States against which jurisdiction has to be exercised for 
purposes of reparation.8
The Court limits itself to expressing “surprise [...] and regret” at the fact 
that “Germany decided to exclude from the scope of its national compensation 
scheme most of the claims by Italian military internees on the grounds that 
prisoners of war were not entitled to compensation for forced labour”9 and then 
goes on to admit that it is not “unaware that the immunity from jurisdiction 
of Germany in accordance with international law may preclude judicial redress 
for the Italian nationals concerned”.10 Indeed, perhaps, it would have been 
sufficient if in its final obiter dictum the Court had asserted more firmly the need 
in any case for Germany to fulfill its obligations deriving from its acknowledged 
international responsibility, or that, as Judge Yusuf suggested in his Dissenting 
Opinion, it had specified, at the very least “an alternative remedy to the victims 
of the breaches to which it has admitted”.11 The Court, however, merely points 
out that certain categories of Italian victims are still entitled, even now, to 
some form of reparation, but it does not go so far as to indicate the forms and 
6   Ibid., 143, para. 100. Further on the judgment’s reasoning, see G. Boggero, ‘Senza 
Immunità (dello Stato), Niente Immunità (Dell’Individuo)’, Diritto Pubblico Comparato 
ed Europeo (2013) 1, 383, 383-403.
7   For example, M. Payandeh, ‘Staatenimmunität und Menschenrechte’, 67 Juristenzeitung 
(2012), 948, 958.
8   I. von Münch, Rechtspolitik und Rechtskultur: Kommentare zum Zustand der Bunderepublik 
Deutschland (2011), 31.
9   Jurisdictional Immunities of the State, Judgment, supra note 2, 142-143, para. 99.
10   Ibid., 144, para. 104.
11   Dissenting Opinion of Judge Yusuf, Jurisdictional Immunities of the State, Judgment, supra 
note 2, 291, 306, para. 53. 
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costs, as this would have amounted to issuing a positive response to the Italian 
counterclaim, which it had previously declared inadmissible.12
In the light of this act, which is both an expression of powerlessness and an 
implicit invitation to the two States to engage in negotiations,13 the international 
doctrine favorable to maintaining the principle of State immunity14 is called 
upon to organize a broader defense of it, capable of justifying its applicative 
consequences. Hereafter, this author will try to assert that upholding State 
immunity does not logically lead to the impunity of the perpetrators of human 
rights violations. On the contrary, the right to State immunity is an essential 
precondition for them to be prosecuted and eventually punished. To come to 
these conclusions it is necessary, whenever possible, to disentangle the individual 
organ of the State from the State itself. In section B., the article will argue 
that prudence of national courts in admitting universal civil jurisdiction against 
State officials is the consequence of a widespread belief according to which 
to admit universal civil jurisdiction against State officials cannot but lead to 
admitting universal civil jurisdiction against the State itself. In reality, universal 
jurisdiction, both criminal and civil, is not an institution established to exercise 
jurisdiction against States but only against individuals; the corollary principle of 
this false belief is to derive functional immunity of State officials directly from 
State immunity. In section C., the article will argue that the two concepts are 
different and should be distinguished. In terms of responsibility this means, as 
laid out in section D., that the State cannot be held responsible in the same way 
as individuals. The two types of responsibilities should also be distinguished.
12   Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy), Order of 6 July 2010, ICJ Reports 
2010, 310, 321, para. 33.
13   Cf. Interview with J. Luther, ‘Moralische Wiedergutmachung für italienische NS-Opfer’, 
Deutschlandradio (9 May 2012), available at http://www.deutschlandradiokultur.de/
moralische-wiedergutmachung-fuer-italienische-ns-opfer.954.de.html?dram:article_
id=147228 (last visited 31 January 2014). Immediately after proclamation of the decision, 
the German Foreign Minister made a statement in which he stressed that Germany had 
already honored its commitments in the past. Cf. ‘Außenminister Westerwelle zum IGH-
Urteil in Sachen Deutschland/Italien’, Press Release of the German Federal Foreign Office 
(3 February 2012), available at http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/DE/Infoservice/Presse/
Meldungen/2012/120203-IGH_ITA.html (last visited 31 January 2014).
14   However, many authors have long proposed reconsidering and even abolishing it. Among 
these see, for example, H. Lauterpacht, ‘The Problem of Jurisdictional Immunities of 
Foreign States’, 28 British Yearbook of International Law (1951), 220, esp. 236-237.
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B. Universal Civil Jurisdiction Is in Principle Admissible  
 Only Against State Officials
One of the main assumptions on which the Italian defense based its 
claim of the existence of a jus cogens exception to the rule of State immunity 
under international law was the practical need of repressing grave violations 
of international humanitarian law and the law of human rights through the 
exercise of universal jurisdiction. The proposition that the exercise of universal 
jurisdiction for crimes against humanity and war crimes is a necessity lacks 
any analysis of the customary nature of the universality of jurisdiction in civil 
matters.
Universal jurisdiction is that institution founded on the co-operation 
among States which makes it possible to prosecute particularly odious crimes, 
regardless of where they occur and thus eliminating the nexus, considered 
fundamental until a short time ago, between the State of the jurisdiction and the 
State in which the crime in question effectively occurred. Overlooking, for the 
moment, the problems deriving from the choice of crimes effectively punishable 
by law,15 serious though they are, the difficulty of guaranteeing the exercise of 
jurisdiction in a truly universal manner16 and the risks inherent in interfering 
in the internal affairs of the State to which the individual charged belongs, 
it seems important to point out that any exercise of universal jurisdiction has 
always been ambivalent in nature, both criminal and individual at the same 
time. It is, in other words, a tool that, though differing in degree depending 
on the particular national legislation, is motivated by the need to prosecute 
persons who are socially dangerous for the international community (hostes 
humani generis), to ensure that certain acts will not happen again. It is not an 
15  These include only grave breaches and serious violations of international humanitarian law 
and law of human rights. As is evident from Art. 40 of the Draft Articles on Responsibility 
of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, Yearbook of the International Law Commission 
(2001), Vol. II (2), 26, 29 [Draft Articles on State Responsibility], simple violations of jus in 
bello and human rights are excluded, unless they are gross and systematic. Cf. P. Stammler, 
Der Anspruch von Kriegsopfern auf Schadensersatz: Eine Darstellung der völkerrechtlichen 
Grundlagen sowie der Praxis internationaler Organisationen und verschiedener Staaten zur 
Anerkennung individueller Wiedergutmachungsansprüche bei Verstößen gegen humanitäres 
Völkerrecht (2009), 125. Critical on this distinction is K. Oellers-Frahm, ‘Redress of War-
Related Claims by Individuals: The Example of the Italian Courts’, in U. Fastenrath et 
al. (eds), From Bilateralism to Community Interest: Essays in Honour of Judge Bruno Simma 
(2011), 1055, 1066-1067.
16   L. Reydams, Universal Jurisdiction: International and Municipal Legal Perspectives (2005), 
220 et seq.
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institution through which to put sovereign States on trial as these, according to 
international custom, cannot be held criminally liable, or, in the words of the 
well-known maxim, societas delinquere non potest.17
As regards individual officials of the State, it is important to bear in 
mind that the exercise of universal criminal jurisdiction against presumed 
criminals has only been possible, up to now, when they no longer held their 
official position in the State (as in the case of Pinochet I).18 In that case, State 
immunity from jurisdiction could not be challenged, insofar as immunity was 
denied in relation to acta jure imperii committed by a person no longer in office. 
That is, once the government functions cease, the exercise of jurisdiction against 
those who performed them is unable to endanger them, or to undermine the 
independence of the State of which the individual was an official.19 Vice versa, as 
17   See Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaškić, Decision on the Objection of the Republic of Croatia 
to the Issuance of Subpoena Duces Tecum, IT-95-14-T, 18 July 1997, para. 49. Cf. J. 
Barboza, ‘State Crimes: A Decaffeinated Coffee’, in L. Boisson de Chazournes & V. 
Gowlland-Debbas (eds), The International Legal System in Quest of Equity and Universality: 
Liber Amicorum Georges Abi-Saab (2001), 357, and J. Schaarschmidt, ‘Die Reichweite 
des völkerrechtlichen Immunitätsschutz – Deutschland v. Italien vor dem IGH’, Beiträge 
zum Europa- und Völkerrecht der Universität Halle-Wittenberg No. 5 (2010), 30-31. On 
the opposition to the international law of the exercise of criminal jurisdiction against 
States, see H. Fox & P. Webb, The Law of State Immunity, 3rd ed. (2013), 89 and the 
Draft Articles on State Responsibility, Commentary to Chapter III, supra note 15, 110, 111 
(paras 5-6). Contra J. Dugard, ‘Criminal Responsibility of States’, in M. Cherif Bassiouni 
(ed.), International Criminal Law, Vol. 1, 2nd ed. (1999), 239, 246; A. Pellet, ‘Can a State 
Commit a Crime? Definitely, Yes!’, 10 European Journal of International Law (1999) 2, 
425, 433-434.
18   Regina v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate and Others, ex Parte Pinochet 
Ugarte, United Kingdom House of Lords, Judgment of 25 November, 3 WLR 1456 (H.L. 
1998) [Pinochet I]. The reasoning followed in Pinochet I was not applied again in Jones v. 
Saudi Arabia, United Kingdom House of Lords, Judgment of 14 June 2006, [2007] 1 AC 
270 [Jones v. Saudi Arabia], as the denial of personal immunity for the former head of 
the Chilean government had to rely on a specific exception to compact law (contained in 
the United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading 
Punishments or Treatments, 10 December 1984, 1465 UNTS 85 [Convention Against 
Torture]) and not as an ordinary exception of functional immunity.
19   Thus also Institute of International Law, ‘Resolution on the Immunity From Jurisdiction 
of the State and of Persons Who Act on Behalf of the State in Case of International 
Crime’ (2009), Art. III (2), available at http://www.idi-iil.org/idiE/resolutionsE/2009_
naples_01_en.pdf (last visited 31 January 2014), 2 [Institute of International Law, 
Resolution on the Immunity From Jurisdiction]: “When the position or mission of any 
person enjoying personal immunity has come to an end, such personal immunity ceases.” 
Contra ILC, Second Report on Immunity of State Officials From Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction, 
UN Doc A/CN.4/631, 10 June 2010, 19-20, para. 33 [Second Report on Immunity of 
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demonstrated in the Arrest Warrant case, immunity ratione personae continues 
to be guaranteed to individuals still in office.20 The risk of an abuse of universal 
jurisdiction for matters of mere political rivalry between States is too great to 
make it possible for them to reach an opinio juris favorable to denial of immunity 
also for individual officials of the State still in office.
Even more uncertain is the exercise of universal civil jurisdiction which, 
at the level of international custom, has not been judged up to now as a 
fundamental corollary of criminal jurisdiction, due to the fact that it touches 
on different, though possibly related, interests with respect to the criminal case. 
Any convention on the subject of the repression of crimes against humanity, or 
any special statutory court, starting with the Court for former Yugoslavia or the 
Tribunal for Rwanda, fails to deal in any way with the problem of civil suits for 
reparation of damages21 and, even if it does, as in the case of the Convention 
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment of 1984,22 it 
does so in very generic terms,23 which cannot be considered as expressing the 
unequivocal will to declare the exercise of universal civil jurisdiction toward the 
State Officials]: “These acts do not cease to be acts of the State because the official ceased 
to be such and they therefore continue as before to be covered by immunity.” Thus also 
A. Cassese, ‘When May Senior State Officials Be Tried for International Crimes? Some 
Comments on the Congo v. Belgium Case’, 13 European Journal of International Law 
(2002) 4, 853, 863.
20   Thus also relative to the former Chief of the Libyan State Muammar El Gaddafi, whose 
incrimination was requested for acts of terrorism, before the French courts. The request 
to exercise criminal jurisdiction was dismissed in 2001 by the Court of Cassation. Cf. 
French Court of Cassation, Case No. 1414, Decision of 13 March 2000, 105 Revue 
Générale de Droit International Public (2001) 2, 473.
21   Although some progress has been made (see Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court, 17 July 1998, Art. 75, 2187 UNTS 3, 134-135), “it cannot be claimed with 
certainty that according to the international law in force there is absolute correspondence 
between the obligation of States to prosecute the perpetrators of international crimes 
and their obligation to guarantee the rights of the victims to seek redress under their 
respective legislation”. M. Frulli, Immunità e Crimini Internazionali: L’Esercizio Della 
Giurisdizione Penale e Civile nei Confronti Degli Organi Statali Sospettati di Gravi Crimini 
Internazionali (2007), 147 (translation by the author). 
22   Convention Against Torture, Art. 14, supra note 18, 116. See, however, Committee Against 
Torture, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 19 of the 
Convention: Conclusions and Recommendations of the Committee Against Torture: Canada, 
UN Doc CAT/C/CR/34/CAN, 7 July 2005, 3 & 4, paras 4 (g) & 5 (f).
23  Never doubting the existence of the principle of the universality of civil jurisdiction is the 
Trial Chamber of the First Instance of the International Criminal Tribunal for former 
Yugoslavia in the decision Prosecutor v. Furundzija, which states that “the victim could 
bring a civil suit for damage in a foreign court, which would therefore be asked inter alia 
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individual, much less toward the State.24 Only the United States, on the basis of 
the Alien Tort Statute of 1789, recognizes the exercise of universal jurisdiction 
on civil matters, although this is exclusively toward officials of the State and not 
against the State itself.25
The extreme prudence of the national courts in admitting universal civil 
jurisdiction against individuals, which – as Conforti claims – would be the 
natural pendant of criminal jurisdiction,26 is based on the strong belief that the 
civil responsibility of the individual official of the State always and inevitably 
also implies a civil responsibility of the State.27  This conclusion derives from the 
idea that functional immunity of State officials is specification of State immunity 
(section C.) and that State officials’ responsibility in criminal and civil matters 
overlaps with State responsibility (section D.).
C. Functional Immunity Is not Specification of State   
 Immunity
The exact relationship between the immunity of States and the functional 
immunity of the individual officials of the State is, in this current stage of 
international law, still up for debate. In its Milde decision, the First Criminal 
Section of the Italian Supreme Court of Cassation accepted the majority theory 
to disregard the legal value of the national authorising act”. Prosecutor v. Anto Furundzija, 
Judgment, IT-95-17/1-T, 10 December 1998, 59-60, para. 155.
24   Thus also C. Tomuschat, ‘Individual Reparation Claims in Instances of Grave Human 
Rights Violations: The Position Under General International Law’, in A. Randelzhofer & 
C. Tomuschat (eds), State Responsibility and the Individual (1999), 1, 11.
25   Alien Tort Claims Act 1789, 28 USC § 1350. On the limits of the exercise of universal civil 
jurisdiction through the ATS see, among others A. Gattini, ‘The Dispute on Jurisdictional 
Immunities of the State before the ICJ: Is the Time Ripe for a Change of the Law?’, 24 
Leiden Journal of International Law (2011) 1, 173, 186 and J. von Bernstorff, M. Jacob & 
J. Dingfelder Stone, ‘The Alien Tort Statute Before the US Supreme Court in the Kiobel 
Case: Does International Law Prohibit US Courts to Exercise Extraterritorial Civil 
Jurisdiction Over Human Rights Abuses Committed Outside of the US?’, 72 Heidelberg 
Journal of International Law (2012), 579.
26   B. Conforti, Diritto Internazionale, 8th ed. (2010), 211. The same opinion is also 
expressed by R. van Alebeek, ‘National Courts, International Crimes and the Functional 
Immunity of State Officials’, 59 Netherlands International Law Review (2012) 1, 5, 21. Cf. 
Concurring Opinion of Judge Breyer, Sosa v. Alvare-Machain and Others, Supreme Court 
of the United States, Judgment of 29 June 2004, Case No. 03-339, (2004) 542 U.S. 692, 
760, 763: “Universal criminal jurisdiction necessarily contemplates a significant degree of 
civil tort recovery as well.”
27   Critical of this position also Stammler, supra note 15, 124-125.
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in doctrine, sustained previously by that same court also in the Ferrini and 
Lozano cases, according to which
“functional immunity [...] is the specification of what is the pertinence 
of the states, as it responds to the need to prevent the prohibition 
of charging foreign States from being overridden by acting against 
the person through whom the activity is implemented. [...] [O]ne 
must, then, agree with those who claim that if functional immunity 
cannot find application, because the act committed is considered 
an international crime, there is no valid reason to maintain the 
immunity of the State.”28
It seems that this is a theory that, despite having the support of authoritative 
experts in doctrine29 and being shared in case law,30 reveals shortcomings on 
many levels. Above all, the theory whereby not granting immunity to the 
officials of the State would be a way of getting around the prohibition to exercise 
jurisdiction against the State is a logical non sequitur. This is shown by the fact 
that, in practice, the States themselves have many times waived immunity for 
individual officials, thereby implicitly admitting that the two immunities differ 
in nature.31
As suggested also by De Sena32 and Balladore Pallieri33, the error thus 
lies in wanting to establish, as a general rule, an almost mathematical equation 
28   Milde, Italian Supreme Court of Cassation, Case No. 1072, Decision of 21 October 2008, 
92 Rivista di Diritto Internazionale (2009) 2, 618, 626 [Milde, Italian Supreme Court of 
Cassation]. In this sense also the Second Report on Immunity of State Officials, supra note 
19, 58, para. 94 (b), which says: “State officials enjoy immunity ratione materiae from 
foreign criminal jurisdiction, i.e. immunity in respect of acts performed in an official 
capacity, since these acts are acts of the State which they serve itself.”
29   Thus, among others, also Fox & Webb, supra note 17, 269-271 and B. Conforti, ‘In 
Tema di Immunità Funzionale Degli Organi Statali Stranieri’, 93 Rivista di Diritto 
Internazionale (2010) 1, 5, 13.
30   Not last is the case of Jones v. Saudi Arabia (supra note 18). Cf. Opinion of Lord Hoffmann 
in this decision (ibid., 291-306, paras 36-102).
31   For diplomatic agents other rules of immunity apply. Cf. van Alebeek, supra note 26, 12-
13.
32   P. De Sena, Diritto Internazionale e Immunità Funzionale Degli Organi Statali (1996), 35 
et seq.
33  V. Balladore Pallieri, Diritto Internazionale Pubblico, 8th ed. (1962), 371.
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between the actions performed as an official and the actions of the State.34 As 
Frulli has shown, the intellectual framework of a similar concept of ‘collective 
responsibility’ has a Kelsenian imprint: the actions of the official are not 
attributable to the individual as such, but to the individual as an organ of the 
State.35 The individual’s behavior should therefore generally be attributed to the 
State and only as an exception, to the individual as well. This is a conclusion that 
is also reached in the Third Report on Immunity of State Officials From Foreign 
Criminal Jurisdiction of the International Law Commission (ILC), which, 
citing the Condorelli brief of appearance in Djibouti v. France, claims that
“[s]uch acts, indeed, are to be regarded in international law as attributable to 
the State on behalf of which the organ acted and not to the individual acting 
as that organ”.36 This explains the aforementioned extreme caution used by the 
courts in admitting civil jurisdiction against the individual State official, as it 
could automatically imply the exercise of jurisdiction against the State on behalf 
of which that official is acting. It is interesting to note how organicistic this 
interpretation is. Even if it is obvious, in a general way, that “[a]ll rational action 
is in the first place individual action. Only the individual thinks. Only the 
individual reasons. Only the individual acts”37 and that therefore “States can 
only act by and through their agents and representatives”,38 in the scenario just 
described, the individual disappears and everything is attributed only to the 
State.39
34   The Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Yousuf v. Samantar and Others, 
Decision of 1 June 2010, (2010) 130 S. Ct. 2278, 2292, recognized the inapplicability of 
the rules of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (90 Stat. 2891) to the individual officials 
of the State. This is an important step in view of a distinction between the two types of 
immunity.
35   H. Kelsen, Principles of International Law, 2nd ed. (rev. & ed. by R. W. Tucker) (1967), 
207.
36   ILC, Third Report on Immunity of State Officials From Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction, UN 
Doc A/CN.4/646, 24 May 2011, 32-33, para. 58 (note 126) [ILC, Third Report on 
Immunity of State Officials]; Certain Questions of Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters 
(Djibouti v. France), Verbatim Record of the Public Sitting held on Tuesday 22 January 
2008, Doc CR 2008/3, 22 January 2008, 9, para. 23.
37   L. von Mises, Socialism: An Economic and Sociological Analysis [1932] (1981), 97.
38   Certain Questions Relating to Settlers of German Origin in the Territory Ceded by Germany 
to Poland, Advisory Opinion, PCIJ Series B, No. 6 (1923), 22.
39   These concerns are also shared by B. Stephens, ‘Abusing the Authority of the State: 
Denying Foreign Official Immunity for Egregious Human Rights Abuses’, 44 Vanderbilt 
Journal of Transnational Law (2011) 5, 1163, 1179.
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The well-known case of Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany is a 
good example in which the perspective of individual responsibility is entirely 
overlooked and replaced by the holistic paradigm of collective guilt. In particular, 
in the Dissenting Opinion in the second degree judgment, Judge Wald supports 
the theory of the implied waiver of immunity by Germany, claiming that ‘Nazi 
Germany’ could have realized that “it might one day be held accountable for its 
heinous actions by any other state, including the United States”.40 Almost as if 
those “heinous acts” had not been the work of several commanding individuals 
and their various executors, but of an imaginary ‘Nazi Germany’ conceived as a 
physical person capable of weighing the future consequences of its actions!
According to Hannah Arendt, the defense of Adolf Eichmann, for whom 
immunity was denied, ratione materiae, by the Israeli Supreme Court, promptly 
tried to prove the innocence of the defendant on an argument that we could 
define as exquisitely Kelsenian, i.e. that Eichmann was nothing but a “tiny cog” of 
the Third Reich.41 Eichmann was the incarnation of the subordinate bureaucrat, 
a mere executor of orders from above, convinced that he did not have to answer 
to himself and to others for his actions. It is the State – claimed the defense – 
that ordered certain actions, and only it can be held responsible. Now, equating 
functional immunity and State immunity, on the one hand, and superimposing 
criminal and civil responsibility on the individual with the international liability 
of the State, on the other, has the effect of legitimizing, without realizing it, 
reasonings of this kind. The celebrated McLeod case is a textbook example of this 
proposition: “[w]hether the process be criminal or civil”, said Secretary of State 
Webster, clarifying the position of the United States in the controversy, 
40   Dissenting Opinion of Judge Wald, Hugo Princz v. Republic of Germany, United States 
Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit, Judgment of 1 July 1994, (1994) 26 F.3d 
1166, 33 ILM 1483, 1494, 1502 (para. 88) (emphasis by the author).
41   H. Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil [1965] (1975), 289. 
Vasilij Grossman, in his novel ‘Everything Flows’, a ferocious testimony and an implacable 
denunciation of Stalinism, had Soviet informers on trial speak these words: “Why on 
earth do you want to accuse little fish like us? Start with the State, judge it. After all, our 
guilt belongs to it, so judge it.” V. Grossman, Tutto Scorre (1987), 79 (cited in accordance 
with the Italian edition; translation by the author). 
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“the fact of having acted under public authority, and in obedience 
to the orders of lawful superiors, must be regarded as a valid 
defence; otherwise individuals would be holden responsible for 
injuries resulting from the acts of government, and even from the 
operations of public war”.42
Along the lines of the historic McLeod case is the judgment, harshly 
criticized by Cassese,43 on the Lozano case, in which the U.S. soldier responsible 
for the death of the agent Nicola Calipari and wounding of the Italian journalist 
Giuliana Sgrena at a checkpoint in Iraq, was not subject to criminal trial, also 
on the basis of the qualification of the soldier’s act as coming within the terms 
of acta jure imperii: 
“[t]he rule of functional immunity is the natural corollary of the 
principle, also customarily recognized, of the ‘restricted’ immunity 
of the States of foreign jurisdiction for civil liability deriving from 
activities of an official nature, jure imperii, materially performed by 
its officials.”44 
As Trapp clarifies, the ‘McLeod principle’ is thus “one of non-concurrence 
of responsibility to the effect that when a State is responsible for conduct, the 
42  Cf. McLeod, 20 November 1854, FO 83. See Letter of Mr. Daniel Webster to Mr. 
Crittenden, 15 March 1841, 29 British and Foreign State Papers (1840-1841), 1139, 
1141. During the rebellion against the British in Ontario in 1837, the Canadian rebels 
occupied an island on the Niagara river, where they were aided by the Americans. To stop 
the Americans from continuing to give aid to the rebels, the British invaded American 
territory to destroy the ship (Caroline), they had been using to transport supplies and 
munitions. A few years later, in 1840, an Englishman who had participated in that raid, 
by the name of McLeod, was arrested while on a visit to New York. By explicit admission 
of the American Secretary of State, “after the avowal of the transaction [...] authorized 
and undertaken by the British Authorities, individuals concerned in it ought not [...] to 
be holden personally responsible in the ordinary tribunals [...] for their participation in 
it”. See Letter of Mr. Webster to Mr. Fox, 24 April 1841, 29 British and Foreign State Papers 
(1840-1841), 1129, 1131.
43   A. Cassese, ‘The Italian Court of Cassation Misapprehends the Notion of War Crimes: 
The Lozano Case’, 6 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2008) 5, 1077, 1087-1089.
44   Lozano Case, Italian Supreme Court of Cassation, Case No. 31171, Decision of 24 July 
2008, 91 Rivista di Diritto Internazionale (2008) 4, 1223, 1232 (translation by the author).
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individual acting on behalf of the State will not be”.45
In this connection, it is also important to clarify that the interpretation 
offered by a certain part of the doctrine and case law,46 claiming that the 
functional immunity of the individual official should be denied and the 
individual subject to criminal proceedings (as well as civil, if necessary), on the 
basis of the qualification of grave violations of human rights as ultra vires acts is 
equally unacceptable. This qualification, rejected by the predominant case law47 
and also by Italy in the controversy on the Jurisdictional Immunities of the State, 
lends itself to the objection on the basis of which rarely can acts of this nature be 
committed ‘in a private capacity’. Rather, the use of an escamotage of this kind 
seems useful as an indication or symptom of increasing sensitivity favorable to 
the identification of the personal responsibility of the individual official, separate 
and different from that of the State,48 also in case of the ‘official’ nature of the 
45   K. N. Trapp, State Responsibility for International Terrorism: Problems and Prospects (2011), 
96. As the Lozano case shows, and in contrast with Trapp’s premise, “the movement away 
from the exclusive responsibility of states” (ibid., 99) is far from complete. Cf. Prosecutor 
v. Tihomir Blaškić, Judgment on the Request of the Republic of Croatia for Review of the 
Decesion of Trial Chamber II of 18 July 1997, IT-95-14-AR108bis, 29 October 1997, 110 
ILR 607, 707-708, para. 38.
46   Cf. Joint Separate Opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans & Buergenthal, Arrest Warrant 
of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium), Judgment, ICJ Reports 
2002, 3, 63, 88-89, para. 85.
47   “It is [...] difficult to accept that torture cannot be a governmental or official act, since 
under article 1 of the Torture Convention torture must, to qualify as such, be inflicted by 
or with the connivance of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity.” 
Jones v. Saudi Arabia, supra note 18, 286, para. 19.
48   See, e.g., Charter of the the International Military Tribunal, 8 August 1945, Art. 7, 82 UNTS 
279, 288: “The official position of defendants, whether as Heads of State or responsible 
officials in Government Departments, shall not be considered as freeing them from 
responsibility or mitigating punishment.” This provision was later taken up in the Statues 
of all the international tribunals established during the 20th century. In one decision, 
the Tribunal of Nurnberg, quoting Art. 228 of the Versailles Treaty and an obiter dictum 
in the case Ex Parte Quirin and Others, Supreme Court of the United States, Judgment 
of 31 July 1942, (1942) 317 U.S. 1, reiterated that “[t]he authors of these acts cannot 
shelter themselves behind their official position in order to be freed from punishment 
in appropriate proceedings”. In Re Goering and Others, International Military Tribunal 
(Nuremberg), Judgment of 1 October 1946, published in Trial of Major War Criminals 
(1947), Vol. I, 171, 223 [In Re Goering and Others, International Military Tribunal]. 
For a criticism, C. Damgaard, Individual Criminal Responsibility for Core International 
Crimes (2008), 98-105. In the Eichmann case, the Israeli Supreme Court denied the 
functional immunity of the defendant insofar as “those who participated in such acts 
must personally account for them and cannot shelter behind the official character of 
their task or mission”. Attorney-General of the Government of Israel v. Eichmann, Israel 
Supreme Court, Judgment of 29 May 1962, 36 ILR 277, 308, 309-310, para. 14. Cf. 
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actions committed.49
The question is not, in this case, in what capacity, official or otherwise, 
the individual committed a certain criminal action, but simply whether he, 
given a moral choice, decided to perform a grave violation of international 
humanitarian law or human rights law. In following the doctrine criticized here, 
Frulli thus suggests guaranteeing, in any case, immunity for acts intra vires.50 
The risk of such a position is to partially identify individual-official activity with 
State activity, in the fear that one could violate the doctrine of the Act of State. 
Actually, for any type of criminal act, there is never a complete overlap between 
the State’s activity and the activity carried out by the individual, considering 
that judgment impinges, so to speak, on individual’s adherence to the act of 
State and not on the act of State itself, and thus the exercise of jurisdiction 
against the individual for jure imperii intra vires cannot be seen as an improper 
interference in the internal affairs of the State, exactly as it is not in the case of 
exercising jurisdiction against an individual for acta jure imperii ultra vires.
D. Individual Responsibility of State Officials Differs   
 Greatly From State Responsibility
It should be in the specific interest of those who appeal to an ethics of 
principles and claim a greater role of the individual in international society to 
reject the aforementioned abstractions of ‘specification’ and ‘collective guilt’, 
holding the individual responsible for his actions even when he acts in the role 
of State agent. To say it in the words of Cassese, 
also the statement by Prof. C. Tomuschat at a hearing held on 12 September 2011 in the 
case Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy: Greece Intervening), Verbatim 
Record of the Public Sitting held on Monday 12 September 2011, Doc CR 2011/17, 27 
(para. 12). [ICJ, Jurisdictional Immunities of the State, Verbatim Record of the Public 
Sitting held on 12 September 2011].
49   As Akande and Shah point out: “Whether or not acts of state officials are regarded as 
official acts does not depend on the legality, in international or domestic law, of those 
acts. Rather, whether or not the acts of individuals are to be deemed official depends 
on the purposes for which the acts were done and the means through which the official 
carried them out.” D. Akande & S. Shah, ‘Immunities of State Officials, International 
Crimes and Foreign Domestic Courts’, 21 European Journal of International Law (2010) 
4, 815, 832.
50   Frulli, supra note 21, 57-58.
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“trials establish individual responsibility over collective assignation 
of guilt, i.e., they establish that not all Germans were responsible for 
the Holocaust, not all Turks for the Armenian genocide, nor all Serbs, 
Muslims, Croats or Hutus but individual perpetrators. Victims are 
prepared to be reconciled with their erstwhile tormentors, because 
they know that the latter have paid for their crimes.”51
This is not dissimilar from the reasoning of the judges of the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ) Shi and Vereschetin in their Joint Declaration on the 
case of Bosnia Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia: “[t]here can be no reconciliation 
unless individual guilt for the appalling crimes of the last few years replaces the 
pernicious theory of collective guilt on which so much racial hatred hangs”.52 
Vice versa, recognition of a criminal or civil responsibility of the State under 
international law exposes States to the risk that the court will merely ‘use’ a 
defendant – for whom, after the final condemnation, it does not even request or 
obtain extradition53 – so that the indemnity is effectively paid exclusively by the 
State of which he is a citizen.54
Pointing to the potential parallel between the responsibility of the State 
and the criminal or civil responsibility of the juridical person, in particular 
the corporation, typical of internal legal orders, serves no purpose.55 In 
this connection, Posner and Sykes submit, indeed, that the international 
responsibility of the State, in particular when aggravated by grave human rights 
51   A. Cassese, ‘Reflections on International Criminal Justice’, 61 Modern Law Review (1998) 
1, 1, 6.
52   Joint Declaration of Judges Shi & Vereshchetin, Application of the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia 
and Montenegro), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1996, 595, 631, 632; H. Shawcross, ‘Let the 
Tribunal Do its Job’, The New York Times (22 May 1996), A17.
53   Seventeen defendants sentenced to life imprisonment for Nazi massacres have never been 
extradited, including Milde. Germany has, in fact, refused repeatedly to arrest them. Cf. 
N.N., ‘Stragi Naziste: 17 Ergastolani non Scontano la Pena’, La Stampa (29 May 2011), 
available at http://www.lastampa.it/2011/05/29/esteri/stragi-naziste-ergastolaninon-scon 
tano-la-pena-HV3Vvy6wzKK5igbqDg5tNL/pagina.html (last visited 31 January 2014).
54   Likewise, Gattini, supra note 25, 191: “It would be inequitable to make the prospect of 
gaining civil damages from a foreign state dependent upon whether or not the individual 
defendant still happens to be alive.”
55   Of a ‘legal person’ mention is made, for example, by J. Bröhmer, State Immunity and the 
Violation of Human Rights (1997), 30. Cf. Barboza, supra note 17, esp. 365.
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violations,56 resembles the vicarious responsibility of the corporation, by virtue of 
the fact that the individual officials of the State, like the employees or workers 
of the company, “will not bear the costs [...] and their personal assets may be 
far smaller than the harm that they have caused”;57 moreover “[e]ven though 
a bureaucratic entity does not maximize profit, it will often face a budget 
constraint and will prefer not to waste resources”.58 Basically, what Posner and 
Sykes are saying is that the institution of civil liability of the State is an efficient 
mechanism for the prevention of international crimes because, on the one hand, 
it is able to absorb the costs of the reparations (of war and other events) more 
easily and, on the other, because it will force the democratic State that does not 
want to dissipate resources publicis usibus destinata to exercise greater control 
over its agents.59 These are theoretical analyses that do not take adequately into 
consideration the fact that the incentives for a State to avoid expenditures to 
which its taxpayers object may differ depending on the political class in each 
case, as well as on the historical era. The same can be said for the real ability 
of the democratic State to control its subjects effectively in order to prevent 
the commission of international crimes. The authors themselves are skeptical of 
the fact that “a prospect of reparations after the end of conflict will necessarily 
discipline states during conflict”.60 A mechanism based on the civil liability of 
the State as a life preserver in case of the insufficiency of private assets would risk 
producing a moral hazard in the individual officials of the State who, aware of 
being called upon to respond – in the worst cases jointly with the State of which 
they are citizens and in the best (according to the ‘McLeod principle’) of not 
having to respond at all – will actually have an incentive to commit violations of 
international humanitarian or human rights law.61
Aside from these observations concerning the different nature of the State 
as a subject of international law, with respect to the corporation, it should be 
said that international law, and therefore also State responsibility, is neither civil 
nor criminal, but sui generis, and this is made clear in the First Report on State 
Responsibility of the ILC, mentioning Kelsen himself: “the law of international 
56   Cf. B. I. Bonafè, The Relationship Between State and Individual Responsibility for 
International Crimes (2009), 17.
57   E. A. Posner & A. O. Sykes, ‘Economic Analysis of State and Individual Responsibility 
Under International Law’, 9 American Law and Economics Review (2007) 1, 72, 87.
58   Ibid., 89.
59   Ibid.
60   Ibid., 100.
61   Similar considerations are found in F. Rosenfeld, ‘Individual Civil Responsibility for the 
Crime of Aggression’, 10 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2012) 1, 249, 261.
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responsibility is neither civil nor criminal, and that it is purely and simply 
international”.62 The distinction between individual responsibility and State 
responsibility is particularly clear if one considers that “the element of faute is 
not a necessary condition to determine liability of a State under contemporary 
international law”63 and that “the defenses for the law of individual responsibility 
generally are wider”.64 This means that a State is sometimes responsible to 
another under international law, even in the absence of a finding of the elements 
of guilt or malice of the agent who is the author of the act,65 or in other words, 
as Nollkaemper writes, “[t]he conduct of a State as a legal person is assessed 
against an objective standard”.66 This discrepancy in the test of the two liabilities 
is explained precisely in the light of the fact that under international law, the 
responsibility of the State has an entirely different nature and is independent 
of individual criminal and civil responsibility,67 because “[t]he State is in 
international law not legally responsible for the act itself, but for its own failure 
to comply with obligations incumbent upon it in relation to acts of the private 
person”.68 Thus, “[t]he law of State responsibility belongs to a separate branch of 
international law and does not depend on nor imply the legal responsibility of 
62   ILC, First Report on State Responsibility, UN Doc A/CN.4/490/Add.1, 1 May 1998, 7-8, 
para. 53. See also Kelsen, supra note 35, 196.
63   P. Dumberry, ‘The Controversial Issue of State Succession to International Responsibility 
Revisited in Light of Recent State Practice’, 49 German Yearbook of International 
Law (2006), 413, 418. Cf. also A. Nollkaemper, ‘Concurrence Between Individual 
Responsibility and State Responsibility in International Law’, 52 International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly (2003) 3, 615, 630.
64   Nollkaemper, supra note 63, 635.
65   Selmouni v. France, ECtHR Application No. 25803/94, Judgment of 28 July 1999, 26-27, 
para. 87.
66   Nollkaemper, supra note 63, 617.
67   Thus also Stephens, supra note 39, 1180-1181. Cf. Opinion of Lord Hutton, Regina v. 
Bartle and the Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis and Others Ex Parte Pinochet and 
Others, United Kingdom House of Lords, Judgment of 24 March 1999, 38 ILM 581, 
627, 640 [Pinochet III]: “This distinction between the responsibility of the state for the 
improper and unauthorised acts of a state official outside the scope of his functions and 
the individual responsibility of that official in criminal proceedings for an international 
crime is recognised in Article 4 and the commentary thereon in the 1996 draft Report 
of the International Law Commission.” The report mentioned here is the Draft Code 
of Crimes Against Peace and Security of Mankind, Yearbook of the International Law 
Commission, Vol. II (2) (1996), 17, para. 50. Similar conclusions are found in the Draft 
Articles on State Responsibility, Art. 58, supra note 15, 30.
68   R. Jennings & A. Watts , Oppenheim’s International Law, Vol. 1, 9th ed. (1992), 501 (note 
13).
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individuals”.69
There is no intention here to propose doing away with the international 
responsibility of the State for the commission of acta jure imperii in violation 
of imperative norms,70 but only to stress the impossibility of superimposing 
or juxtaposing71 two different types of responsibility, individual criminal and 
civil responsibility, on the one hand, and the international responsibility of the 
State, on the other. The latter remains firmly in place even in the absence of 
the exercise of jurisdiction by a court.72 Indeed, on a closer look, determination 
of the international responsibility of a State is not even one of the tasks of the 
national courts73 which, on the basis of international law, are called upon to 
judge only on the responsibility of a criminal and civil nature of individuals. 
This, however, does not mean that starting from the same wrongful act it may 
not be possible to postulate, in accordance with the provisions of the ILC,74 
69   E. van Sliedregt, Individual Criminal Responsibility in International Law (2012), 5.
70   Rather, as pointed out also in the Draft Articles on State Responsibility, Art. 7, supra note 
15, 26, “[t]he conduct of an organ of a State or of a person or entity empowered to exercise 
elements of the governmental authority shall be considered an act of the State under 
international law if the organ, person or entity acts in that capacity, even if it exceeds 
its authority or contravenes instructions”. Thus also Convention Respecting the Laws 
and Customs of War on Land, 18 December 1907, Art. 3, 36 Stat. 2277, 2290, whereby 
  “[a State] shall be responsible for all acts committed by persons forming part of its armed 
forces”. Only in the measure in which it is proven that the act committed by the official 
agent of the State has a private nature or is committed by a subject in his position as a 
private citizen, then it will not be possible to attribute the responsibility to the State to 
which that individual belongs. Draft Articles on State Responsibility, Commentary to Art. 
7, supra note 15, 46-47, paras 7-9. The occurrence of such a condition is unlikely in case 
of war. Cf. Stammler, supra note 15, 44.
71   Contra Borsari, according to whom “the ontological jumble” between the responsibility 
of the individual and the responsibility of the state would be “inevitable”. R. Borsari, 
Diritto Punitivo Sovranazionale Come Sistema (2007), 444 (translation by the author).
72   Similarly Frulli, supra note 21, 160 who states: “We have to reiterate that, even if we 
think the state cannot be brought to judgment before a civil court on the internal plan, 
it is responsible for the actions performed by its organs acting ultra vires in violation of 
international law” (translation by the author).
73   The Draft Articles on State Responsibility (supra note 15) do not clarify who has jurisdiction. 
In general, we can say that the International Court of Justice (ICJ) can decide for the 
cases in which it has jurisdiction, or otherwise other international courts that the State 
has authorized by means of an agreement to resolve disputes on this subject.
74   ILC, Third Report on Immunity of State Officials, supra note 36, 32-33, para. 58: “[A]
ttributing to the State actions performed by an official in an official capacity does not 
mean that they cease to be attributed to that official.”
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a dual responsibility or, better to say, a “dual attribution of responsibility”.75 
Rather, the same international custom shows that “a limited number of acts can 
lead both to State and individual responsibility”.76 The point is not, actually, 
whether the State should or should not be charged with any responsibility, but 
what type of responsibility should be attributed to it, or, whether it is acceptable 
that an international custom should develop favorable to the recognition of the 
criminal and civil responsibility of the State for international crimes.
This ontological jumble of different types of responsibilities77 derives 
from an excessively holistic approach to reality and produces paradoxical 
consequences. If, for example, Chile were effectively responsible for the atrocities 
against the opposers of the regime, why the decision to try General August 
Pinochet and why not sue the Chilean State for damages? Perhaps because, aside 
from the fact that State immunity would probably have been recognized,78 it 
would have seemed sinful more than twenty years after the wrongful deeds to 
demand reparation from the Chilean taxpayers who, from the standpoint of 
criminal law could not be said to be responsible for the crimes committed by 
the government of General August Pinochet.79 The danger, in short, is that of a 
paradoxical redistributive effect, or “churning”, as the Hungarian philosopher 
Anthony de Jasay80 calls it, whereby in this particular case, those relatives of 
the tortured victims who had not taken their case to court might in theory 
75   Nollkaemper, supra note 63, 620.
76   Ibid., 618-619.
77   In ILC, Preliminary Report on Immunity of State Officials From Foreign Criminal 
Jurisdiction, UN Doc A/CN.4/654, 31 May 2012, 5, para. 17, the different nature of the 
two responsibilities is not made clear, claiming that “there could scarcely be objective 
grounds for asserting that one and the same act of a an official was, for the purposes 
of State responsibility, attributed to the State and considered to be its act, and, for the 
purposes of immunity from jurisdiction, was not attributed as such and was considered 
to be only the act of an official”.
78   Cf. Opinion of Lord Hutton, Pinochet III, supra note 67, 640: “Chile is responsible for 
acts of torture carried out by Senator Pinochet, but could claim state immunity if sued 
for damages for such acts in a court in the United Kingdom.”
79   Lord Hoffmann also grasps this contradiction in Jones v. Saudi Arabia observing that: “It 
would be strange to say [...] that the torture ordered by General Pinochet was attributable 
to him personally for the purposes of criminal liability but only to the State of Chile for 
the purposes of civil liability.” Opinion of Lord Hoffmann, Jones v. Saudi Arabia, supra 
notes 18 & 30, 299, para 68.
80   A. de Jasay, The State (1998), 254-266. Cf. the statement of Prof. Christian Tomuschat at 
the hearing of 12 September 2011: “When talking about the responsibility of a State, one 
really talks about the responsibility of a people, many members of which may also have 
been the victims of the same régime that caused injury through breaches of international 
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have been required to indemnify, as taxpayers of the Chilean State, the victims 
who had.81 As Barboza neatly sums it up: “[c]reating State Crimes would mean 
to introduce a type of responsibility where the innocent are punished together 
with the guilty”.82 Even Nollkaemper is aware of the problem and, for the cases 
of international crimes committed “by a small group of leaders of a State”, he 
wonders whether it is “still useful to strive for separate responsibility of the 
state”.83 Actually, the manner in which Nollkaemper poses the question is not 
entirely correct, if it is true that he himself, shortly after, says that “it would 
be odd [...] to consider that a president of a state should have to be imprisoned 
for many years, whilst leaving in place the structures that made possible and 
facilitated his acts”.84 The international responsibility of the State remains secure 
even in this case, therefore, until it has guaranteed a reparation which, in a 
case like this, will consist of stopping the wrongful acts or in eliminating the 
norms that authorize or facilitate those acts. What will be lacking, however, by 
reason of the recognition of the principle of immunity, will be a civil or criminal 
responsibility of the State.
In this connection, the words written by Hannah Arendt in 1963 still 
apply today, that is 
“a thing called collective guilt does not exist and much less is there a 
thing called collective innocence. If this were not so, no one would 
be guilty or innocent. Naturally this is not to deny that there is such 
a thing as political responsibility. This, however, is independent 
from that which can be done by an individual who belongs to the 
law.” ICJ, Jurisdictional Immunities of the State, Verbatim Record of the Public Sitting 
held on 12 September 2011, supra note 48, 27 (para. 12).
81   The potential clash between the person who commits the misdeed and the person who 
is effectively called to respond in monetary and patrimonial terms is amplified, among 
other things, following the succession between States, as in the case of the Third Reich and 
the Bundesrepublik. This led to the proposal by Stern, to cut the cord of succession in case 
of violations of the rules of jus cogens. B. Stern, ‘Responsabilité International et Succession 
d’Etats’, in Boisson de Chazournes & Gowlland-Debbas, supra note 17, 327, 353 et seq. 
Actually “the solution depends on the different factors and circumstances involved [...] on 
the type of succession of States”. Dumberry, supra note 63, 419-420.
82   Barboza, supra note 17, 369.
83   Nollkaemper, supra note 63, 625.
84   Ibid.
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group, and therefore cannot be judged in moral terms, or subjected 
to the scrutiny of a criminal court”.85
The responsibility of the State under international law will never be 
either civil or criminal, but simply international. Even the International 
Military Tribunal of Nuremberg was clear on this point, stating that “[c]rimes 
are committed by men, and not by abstract entities, and only by punishing 
individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions of international law 
be enforced”.86 And in criminal procedures with civilians bringing charges, in 
which a State is the defendant, it cannot be said that the substance changes.87 
Quite the contrary, sometimes the civil reparation is ideally transformed into a 
sort of fine, a ‘punishment’ to inflict on the State to which the official/executor 
belonged.88
Following Nollkaemper’s reasoning, the exercise of jurisdiction against a 
single individual may then serve also as a form of reparation to the victims, as 
occurred, for example, in the Rainbow Warrior case.89 In this connection, the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) could, therefore, have ordered Germany to 
85   Arendt, supra note 41, 297-298.
86   In Re Goering and Others, International Military Tribunal, supra note 48, 223.
87   Thus also Posner, & Sykes, supra note 57, 96, according to which “the distinction between 
‘civil’ and ‘criminal’ penalties for corporations and states is a meaningless one”.
88   As emphasized also by Chiavario: “Behind the apparent battle ‘for damages’ demands 
of authentic justice in broader terms often, and almost inevitably, make an appearance 
and there may even be more or less admitted pressure to obtain revenge through the 
public hand: while the former are perfectly understandable, the latter are certainly not 
to be condoned.” M. Chiavario, Diritto Processuale Penale, Profilo Istituzionale (2007), 
197 (translation by the author). On the undoubtedly more effective nature of the civil 
procedure, rather than the criminal, toward a State, see Fox & Webb, supra note 17, 93. 
Even the Military Court of Appeals of Rome, in its decision condemning Max-Josef 
Milde, highlights the unquestionably “afflictive character” of the reparation imposed on 
Germany. Milde, Military Court of Appeals of Rome, Decision No. 72/2007 (copy on file 
with author). And effectively, the Italian Constitutional Court in its Decision of 14 July 
1986, Case No. 184, Informazione Previdenziale 1987, 664 states that “it is impossible to 
deny or consider unreasonable the fact that civil liability for an illicit act is able to provide 
not only for the restoration of the property of the damaged party, but among other things, 
at times, also and at least in part and additionally, may serve to prevent and punish the 
illicit act, as it does in the case of reparation for damages unrelated to property resulting 
from a crime. Alongside criminal responsibility, civil responsibility can very well fulfill a 
preventive and sanctioning role” (translation by the author).
89   Nollkaemper, supra note 63, 636 and thereafter contra see ILC, Fifth Report on State 
Responsibility, UN Doc A/CN.4/291 and Add 1 & 2, Yearbook of the International Law 
Commission (1976), Vol. II (1), 3, 33, para 101.
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fulfill its obligation as identified by the primary rules of international law, to 
punish the individual officials of the State, authors of war crimes and crimes 
against humanity against Italian civilians and military personnel, in particular 
by making their extradition to Italy possible.90 In the past, in fact, there had 
been some pronouncements by national and international tribunals with which 
the principle of State immunity was saved while, at the same time, the exercise 
of criminal jurisdiction and, in the United States, civil jurisdiction as well,91 was 
guaranteed against the guilty parties. In this way, for example, it occurred for 
the much-criticized Al-Adsani case to be heard, where immunity was recognized 
for the State (Kuwait), but not ratione materiae for the individual officials of the 
State, guilty of torture of the plaintiff in the suit. The English Courts gave the 
applicant leave to serve the proceedings on the individual defendants.92 This is 
justified on the basis of the fact that international custom does not envisage the 
obligation to recognize the functional immunity from civil jurisdiction of the 
individual State officials for grave violations of human rights.93
90   Nollkaemper, supra note 63, 638.
91   Stephens mentions a single case outside the United States, in which civil jurisdiction was 
exercised against an individual official of the State, specifically in the Milde case. In it, 
however, this choice seemed due more than anything else to the need to oblige the Federal 
Republic of Germany to respond jointly with the defendant. After the charge relative to 
the order of reparation by Germany following the decision of the ICJ had fallen, it could 
be said that the decision of the Italian judges was a fortiori innovative. Cf. Stephens, supra 
note 39, 1177 and on the Milde criminal case see also G. Boggero, ‘Giustizia per i Crimini 
Internazionali di Guerra Nella Strage di Civitella?’, in Procura Generale Militare Presso 
la Corte di Cassazione (ed.), Casi e Materiali di Diritto Penale Militare (2013), 277. 
92   Al Adsani v. United Kingdom, ECtHR Application No. 35763/97, Judgment of 21 
November 2001, 4, paras 14-15. Quite surprisingly, in the case Jones and Other vs. United 
Kingdom the European Court of Human Rights decided – it is not clear how deliberately 
– not to take into account what the English courts had held in the Al-Adsani Case and 
applied the rationale of State immunity also to immunity ratione materiae. See Jones 
and Others vs. United Kingdom, ECtHR Application No. 34356/2006 & 40528/2006, 
Judgment of 14 January 2014, paras 199-215. See also P. Webb, ‘Jones v. UK: The Re-
Integration of State and Official Immunity’, EJIL: Talk! (14 January 2014), available at 
http://www.ejiltalk.org/jones-v-uk-the-re-integration-of-state-and-official-immunity/ 
(last visited 31 January 2014).
93   Stephens, supra note 39, 1175 and Institute of International Law, ‘Resolution on the 
Immunity From Jurisdiction’, Art. III (1), supra note 19, 2. According to Focarelli 
there appears to be a tendency in act “to transplant the legal regime of functional 
immunity operating in [...] [international tribunals] to the domestic sphere”. C. Focarelli, 
International Law as Social Construct: The Struggle for Global Justice (2012), 388-389.
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E. Conclusion
The safeguard of fundamental human rights, in times of war as in times of 
peace, cannot but pass through an exercise of universal jurisdiction, both criminal 
and civil, against those really responsible for their violation: individuals. De lege 
ferenda, therefore, the applicability of functional immunity for the individual 
– aside from temporary immunity ratione personae and provisions of exception 
to conventional rules – should not be recognized, whatever the act committed 
by the accused and/or defendant, including acta jure imperii. The puissance 
publique of the State would effectively remain immune and inappellable at the 
jurisdictional level, while only the single commission of the ‘act of dominion’ 
by the individual would be subject to jurisdiction and judgment of criminal 
and/or civil responsibility.94 Since there can be no superimposition between the 
organ of the State and the State to which it belongs, there can thus also be 
no application ex officio of immunity for the individual-organ as there is for 
the State.95 Only the awareness that “a person and his conduct cannot be split 
from each other” and that the latter “cannot be transferred to another person, 
whether physical or moral”96 can persuade doctrine and jurisprudence of the 
logical necessity to exercise criminal and civil jurisdiction for grave violations 
of international humanitarian law and human rights law exclusively against 
individuals while, however, holding firm to the right of immunity for States.97
94   Of the same opinion also Stephens, supra note 39, 1179: “Both the state and the official 
can be held responsible for an act committed in the exercise of state authority, and an 
official can be denied immunity even if the state is deemed to be immune.” And also: 
“And in both situations, a decision to deny immunity to the individual is separate from 
whether the State itself is immune—a distinction that reflects the different policy issues 
underlying state and official immunity.” Ibid., 1182.
95   Thus also Frulli, supra note 21, 60.
96   Barboza, supra note 17, 364.
97   Also sharing the ratio of a choice of this kind would seem to be the case of C. I. Keitner, 
‘Officially Immune?: A Response to Bradley and Goldsmith’, 36 Yale Journal of International 
Law Online (2010), 1, 12: “National courts can, in appropriate circumstances, impose 
legal consequences for such conduct. This is true even though the State might also bear 
responsibility, and even though the State itself might be immune from suit in a foreign 
court.” Similar conclusions appear also to be reached by the Rapporteur of the Netherlands 
Society of International Law. Cf. M. M. T. A. Brus, ‘No Functional Immunity of State 
Officials for International Crimes: A Principled Choice With Pragmatic Restrictions’, 
Mededelingen van de Nederlandse Vereniging voor Internationaal Recht [Announcements 
of the Dutch Society of International Law] No. 138 (2011), 37, esp. 64-65. See van 
Alebeek, supra note 26, 34 (note 147) and Institute of International Law, ‘Resolution on 
the Immunity From Jurisdiction’, Art. IV, supra note 19, 2, according to which the denial 
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of functional immunity is not of any effective prejudice “to the issue whether and when 
a State enjoys immunity from jurisdiction before the national courts of another State in 
civil proceedings relating to an international crime committed by an agent of the former 
State”.
